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A b s t r a c t
We reformulate the problem of the "interpretation of quantum
mechanics" as the problem of deriving the quantum-mechanical
formalism from a set of simple physical postulates.  We suggest
that the common unease with taking quantum mechanics as a
fundamental description of nature could derive from the use of an
incorrect notion - as the unease with the Lorentz transformations
before Einstein derived from the notion of observer-independent
t ime.
Following an analysis of the measurement process as described by
different observers, we propose a reformulation of quantum
mechanics in terms of information theory.  We propose three
physical postulates, out of which the formalism of the theory can be
reconstructed; these are based on the notion of information that
systems have about each other.   All systems are assumed to be
equivalent: no observer-observed distinction, and information is
interpreted as correlation.
We then suggest that the incorrect notion that generates the unease
with quantum mechanics is the notion of observer-independent state
of a system.
1.  A reformulation of the problem of the "Interpretation of
Quantum Mechanics"
In this paper, we discuss a novel point of view about quantum
mechanics.  This point of view is not antagonistic to current ones,
as the "Copenhagen" [Heisenberg 1927, Bohr 1935],  consistent
histories [Griffiths 1984, Omnes 1988], coherent histories [Gell-
Mann and Hartle 1990], many-worlds [Everett 1957,  Wheeler 1957,
DeWitt 1970], quantum event [Huges 1989] ... interpretations, but
rather combines and complements them.   The point of view we
discuss is based on a critique of a notion generally assumed
uncritically: the notion of absolute, or observer-independent, state
of a system.   We analyze this notion in detail, and observe that the
experimental evidence at the basis of quantum mechanics indicates
that: different observers may give different descriptions of the
same sequence of events.   We then argue that the notion of
observer-independent state of a system is inadequate to describe
the physical world beyond the ¡ ‘ 0  limit, in the same sense in
which the notion of observer-independent time is inadequate to
describe the physical world beyond the c‘0 limit.  We thus consider
the possibility of replacing the notion of observer-independent state
with a notion that refers to the relation between  physical systems.
1.1 Unease
The motivation of the present work is the observation that in spite
of the 67 years lapsed from the discovery of quantum mechanics, and
in spite of the variety of approaches developed with the aim of
clarifying its physical content and improving the original
formulation, quantum mechanics still maintains a certain level of
obscurity.  Quantum mechanics is even accused of being unreasonable
and unacceptable, even inconsistent, by world-class physicists (For
example, [Newman 1993]). Our point of view in this regard is that
quantum mechanics synthesizes most of what we have learned so far
about the physical world: The issue is not to replace it, but to
understand what   it actually says about the world, or, equivalently,
what precisely we have learned from experimental microphysics.
Still, it is  difficult to overcome the sense of unease that quantum
mechanics communicates.  The source of this unease is different in
different interpretations. It is expressed, for instance, in the
objections the supporters of each interpretation raise against other
interpretations. For instance: Is there something "physical"
happening when the wave function "collapses"?  Is it really possible
that observer and measurement, including wave function reduction,
could not be described in Schrödinger evolution-terms?  How can a
classical world emerge from a quantum reality? If somebody would
prepare me in a quantum superposition of two ordinary states, how
would I feel?  If the Planck constant were 25 orders of magnitude
larger, how would the world look like? Who chooses the family of
consistent histories that describe a set of events, and can this
"chooser" be described quantum mechanically?  And so on. Some of
these questions are probably naive, or ill posed.  But the fact that
they keep being asked is, we believe, a sign that the problem of the
interpretation of quantum mechanics has not been fully disentangled
yet.  In this paper, we address this sense of unease.
1.2 A strategy and a historical model
Our strategy is characterized by two ideas:
1. We take a different route to the problem of giving an
interpretation to quantum mechanics than most of the current
interpretations: The effort in this paper is not to a p p e n d   a
reasonable interpretation to the quantum mechanics formalism,  but
rather to d e r i v e  the formalism from a set of physical,
experimentally motivated, assertions ("postulates", or "principles")
about the world.  We suspect that such a derivation is what may
unravel the puzzle of the interpretation of quantum mechanics.
2. We suggest that the sense of unease with quantum mechanics
derives from the use of a concept inappropriate to describe the
physical world. We argue that this concept is the concept of
observer-independent state of a system.
The reasons for exploring such a strategy are illuminated by
considering an obvious historical precedent: special relativity.
Special relativity is a well understood physical theory, accredited
to Einstein's 1905 celebrated paper.  However, the formal content of
special relativity is entirely coded in the Lorentz transformations,
which were written by Lorentz, not by Einstein, and several years
before 1905.  What was Einstein's contribution? It was to
understand the physical meaning of the Lorentz transformations. We
could say, in a provocative manner, that Einstein's contribution to
special relativity was the interpretation of the theory, not its
f o rma l i sm  : the formalism already existed.   Einstein was so
persuasive with his interpretation of the Lorentz equations because
he did not append   an interpretation to them: rather, he re-derived ␣
them, starting from two "postulates" with clear physical meaning
(equivalence of inertial observers - universality of the speed of
light) taken as facts of experience.  This procedure unraveled the
physical content and provided a solid interpretation  of the Lorentz
transformations.  We suggest that, in order to grasp the full physical
meaning of quantum mechanics, a similar result should be achieved:
Find a small number of simple statements with clear physical
meaning, from which the formalism of quantum mechanics could be
derived.  To our knowledge, such a derivation has not been achieved
yet.  In this paper, we do not reach this result in a fully satisfactory
manner, but we discuss a possible reconstruction scheme.
Furthermore, Lorentz transformations were perceived as rather
unreasonable and inacceptable, even inconsistent,  before 1905.
Lorentz's physical interpretation (physical contraction of bodies
moving with respect to the ether, due to complex and unknown
electromagnetic interaction between the atoms of the bodies and the
ether) was quite unattractive, and remarkably similar to certain
interpretat ions of the wave funct ion col lapse present ly
investigated.  In deriving the Lorentz transformations, Einstein
could point out the reason for the unease: the implicit use of a
concept (observer-independent time) inappropriate to describe
reality, or, equivalently, a common assumption about reality
(simultaneity is observer-independent) which was physically
incorrect.  The unease with the Lorentz transformations derived
from a conceptual scheme in which an incorrect notion, absolute
simultaneity, was assumed, yielding in any sorts of paradoxical
situations.
In this paper, we consider the hypothesis that all "paradoxical"
situations associated with quantum mechanics (as the famous and
unfortunate half-dead Schrödinger cat [Schrödinger 1935]) follow
from some analogous incorrect notion  that we use in thinking about
quantum mechanics. (Not in using quantum mechanics, since we seem
to have learned to use it in a remarkably effective way.)   The main
aim of this paper, therefore, is to hunt for this incorrect notion,
with the hope that by digging it out, and exposing it clearly to
everybody's contempt, we could free ourselves from our unease with
our best theory of motion, and fully understand what the theory is
saying about the world. We will argue that this notion is the notion
of observer-independent state of the system.
The program we have outlined is thus to do for the formalism of
quantum mechanics what Einstein did for the Lorentz
transformations:  i. Find a set of simple assertions about the world,
with clear physical meaning, that we know are experimentally true
(postulates); ii. Analyze these postulates, and show that from their
conjunction it follows that certain common assumptions about the
world are incorrect; iii. Derive the full formalism of quantum
mechanics from these postulates. We expect that if this program
could be completed, we would have "understood" quantum mechanics.
1.3 Structure of the paper
We analyze the measurement process as described by two distinct
observers, in section 2. This analysis leads us to the main idea, the
observer dependence of the state, and to recognize a few key
concepts in terms of which, we suggest, the quantum mechanical
description of reality "makes sense".  Prominent among these is the
concept of information [Shannon 1949, Wheeler 1988, 1989, 1992].
In section 3 we switch from an inductive to a (mildly) deductive
mode: we put forward a set of notions, and a set of simple physical
statements, from which we reconstruct the formalism of quantum
mechanics. We denote these statements as "postulates", at the risk
of misunderstanding:  we do not claim any mathematical nor
philosophical r igor or completeness in our derivation -
supplementary assumptions are made along the way.  We are not
interested here in a formalization of the subject, but only in
grasping its "physics".   Finally, in section 4 we discuss the picture
of the physical world that has emerged.  In particular, we compare
the approach we have developed with several currently popular
interpretations of quantum mechanics, and we argue that the
differences between them disappear if one takes into account the
analysis presented here.
2.  Quantum mechanics is a theory about information
In this section, we present a preliminary analysis of the process of
measurement, and we introduce the main new ideas. Throughout this
section, standard quantum mechanics and standard interpretation
(say: formalism and interpretation in [Dirac 1930] or [Messiah 1958])
are assumed.
2.1 The third man problem
Consider an observer O that makes a measurement on a system S.  We
may think of O (for the moment) as a classical macroscopic
measuring apparatus, including or not including a human being - this
being irrelevant for what follows.  Assume that the quantity being
measured, say Q, may take two values, say A and B (when Q has value
A with certainly, we also say: "S has the property A"); and let the
states of the system S be described by vectors (rays) in a two
(complex) dimensional Hilbert space HS.  Let the two eigenstates of
the operator corresponding to the measurement of Q be |A> and |B>.
If, at a time t=t1 prior to the measurement, S is in one of the two
eigenstates of Q, say |A>, then, when the measurement is performed,
the measuring apparatus detects the value A, and the state of the
system S is not affected.  On the other hand, if S is in a generic
normalized state  |ψ> = α |A> + β |B>, where α and β  are complex
numbers and |α|2 + |β|2 = 1, then O can measure either one of the two
values A and B - the respective probabilities being |α|2 and |β|2.
Let us assume that in a given specific measurement  the outcome of
the measurement is A.  From now on, we concentrate on describing
this  specific experiment, which we denote as E .  The system S is
affected by the measurement, and at a time t=t2  after the
measurement, the state of the system is |A>.  In the physical
sequence of events E , the states of the system at t1 and t2 are thus
t1         ‘ t2
α |A>+β |B> ‘ |A> . (1)
This is the standard account of a measurement, according to
quantum mechanics.
Let us now consider this same sequence of events E, as described by
a second   observer, which we refer to as O'.
  
 O' is an observer
different from O.   We refer to O as "he" and to O' as "she".  O'
describes a system formed by S and O.  Therefore she views both S
and O as sub-systems of the larger S-O system she is considering.
Again, we assume O' uses conventional quantum mechanics. We
assume that O' does not perform any measurement on the S-O system
during the t1 -t2  interval, but that she knows the initial states of
both S and O, and is able to give a quantum mechanical description of
the set of events E .   She describes the system S by means of the
Hilbert space HS considered above, and O by means of a Hilbert space
HO .   The S-O system is then described by the tensor product HSO  =
HSˆHO.  Let us denote the vector in HO that describes the state of the
observer O at t=t1 (prior to the measurement) as |init>.   The physical
process during which O measures the quantity Q of the system S
implies a physical interaction between O and S.
 
In the process of
this interaction, the state of O changes.  If the initial state of S is
|A> (and the initial state of O is |init>), then |init> evolves to a state
that we denote as |OA>.  We may think of |OA> as a state in which the
position of the hand of the measuring apparatus points towards the
mark "A".  In the course of the interaction S remains in the state |A>.
Thus, the state  |A>ˆ |initial>  in HSO  evolves to the state  |A>ˆ |OA>:
 t1    ‘  t2
 |A>ˆ |init> ‘  |A> ˆ|OA>. (2)
Analogously, if the initial state of the S-O system is  |B>ˆ |init>, it
will evolve to a state  |B>ˆ |OB>, where |OB> is a state of O that can
be thought of as describing the position of the hand of the measuring
apparatus pointing towards the mark "B"
 t1    ‘  t2
 |B> ˆ |init> ‘  |B> ˆ |OB>. (3)
It is not difficult to construct model Hamiltonians that produce
evolutions of this kind, and can be taken as models for the physical
interactions that produce such a measurement.
Let us now consider the actual case of the experiment E , in which
the initial state of S is |ψ> = α |A>+β |B>. The initial full state of the
S-O system is then
|ψ>ˆ|init>   =  (α |A>+β |B>)ˆ |init> .
Because of the linearity of quantum mechanics, we have from (2) and
(3):
t1           ‘        t2
(α |A>+β |B>)ˆ|init>     ‘     α |A>ˆ|OA> + β  |B>ˆ|OB>.    (4)
Thus, at t=t2␣ the system S-O is in the state α |A>ˆ |OA>+β |B>ˆ |OB>.
This is the conventional description of a measurement as a physical
process, originally due to Jauch [Jauch 1968].
We have described an actual physical process E taking place in a real
laboratory.  Standard quantum mechanics requires us to distinguish
system from observer, but it allows us some freedom in drawing the
line that distinguishes the two [von Neumann 1932].  The peculiarity
of the above analysis is just the fact that we exploited this freedom
in order to describe the same sequence of physical events in terms
of two different descriptions. In the first description, the line that
distinguishes system from observer is set between S and O.  In the
second , between S-O and O'
.  
We recall that we assume that O'
 
is not
making a measurement on the S-O system; there is no physical
interaction between S-O and O'
 
during the t1-t2  interval. (O' may
perhaps make a measurement at a later time t3:  then, as shown by
von Neumann, the probabilities and the final quantum states that one
computes assuming that the collapse happened between t1 and t2 or
between t2 and  t3 are in agreement.)
Thus, we have two descriptions of the physical sequence of events
that we have denoted E :  The description (1) given by the observer O
and the description (4) given by the observer O'.  The point we would
like to stress here is that these are two distinct c o r r e c t
descriptions of the same sequence of events E .  In the O description,
the system S is in the state |A> and the hand of the measuring
apparatus indicates "A".  While according to the O'-description, S is
not in the state |A> and the hand of the measuring apparatus does not
indicate "A".
One can take the view that outcomes of measurements are the only
physical content of the theory [Heisenberg 1927, van Fraassen 1991].
Then the account (4)  has nothing to say about reality at time  t2, and
O' does not know anything about what happens between t1 and some
later time t3 in which she (O') performs a measurement; anything in
between is like the "non-existing" trajectory of the electron, of
which we are not allowed to say anything.   However, even within
this perspective, O and O' give very different accounts of S at t=t2:
O claims that, at t=t2, S has the property A;  while O' claims that at
t=t2 the quantity Q does not have any determined value.  Thus: the
two accounts differ both as far as states are concerned and as far as
measurements' outcomes are concerned.  The conclusion we derive
from this discussion, and that we are going to explore in the rest of
this work,  is then:
Main observation:  In quantum mechanics different observers may
give different accounts of the same sequence of events.
2.2 Relation between the two descriptions
Does the observer O'
 
 "know"  that O has made a measurement on S?
The answer is yes, for a number of reasons.  First, the observer O'
has a full account of the events in E , so it should be possible to
interpret her description (4) as expressing the fact that O has
measured S.  Indeed this is possible:   The key observation is that the
final state at t2 is a correlated state.  This state is given as the
quantum superposition of two states: in the first, (|A>ˆ |OA>), S is in
the |A> state and the hand of the observer is on the "A" mark. In the
second, ( |B>ˆ |OB>), S is in the |B> state and the hand of the observer
is on the "B" mark.  In both cases, the hand of O is on the mark that
correctly represents the state of the system.  More technically,  O'
could measure an observable M that checks whether the hand of O
indicates the correct state of S. If he did so, then the outcome of
this measurement would be "yes" with certainty. The operator M is
given by
M  |A>ˆ|OA> =  |A>ˆ|OA>,  M  |A>ˆ|OB> =  0 ,
M  |B>ˆ|OB>  =  |B>ˆ|OB> , M  |B>ˆ|OA> =  0 , (5)
where the eigenvalue 1 means "yes, the hand of O indicates the
correct state of S" and the eigenvalue 0  means "no, the hand of O
does not indicates the correct state of S".    Thus, it is perfectly
meaningful to say that, according to the O' description, O "knows"
the quantity Q of S, or that he "has measured" the quantity Q of S.
On the other side, the observer O' does not know "what is the value
of the observable Q". (She could measure it, but the outcome of the
measurement is not determined with certitude at t=t2 .)  In
particular she does not know "what precisely O knows about Q".
(Again, she could measure whether O is in |OA>, or in |OB>.)  Thus, we
must distinguish the statement "O' knows that O knows about Q"
from the statement "O' knows what O knows about Q".  Of course this
is a consistent distinction, common in everyday life (I know t ha t
you know the amount of your salary, but I do not know what   you
know about the amount of your salary).  This distinction will soon
become important.
The feature of the final state α |A>ˆ |OA>+β|B>ˆ |OB> that allows us
(or O') to interpret it as containing the information that O has
measured S is the fact that the state is a correlated state. The
operator M, indeed, essentially checks the correlation between |A>
and |OA> and between |B> and |OB>.  Thus, from the point of view of
the O'
 
description:
The fact that  O knows about  S  (or has measured  Q) is expressed
by the existence of a correlation between the state of  S  and the
state of  O.
2.3  Main discussion
Let us return to the "Main observation" that we stated at the end of
section 2.1, namely the observation that the description of a system
is observer dependent.
A possibility of avoiding such a conclusion is to deny the possibility
that O, an observer, could be described as a quantum system.  This is
Bohr's point of view [Bohr 1949]. If we accept it, then we have to
separate reality into two kinds of systems: quantum mechanical
systems on one side, and classical observers (or a unique observer)
on the other side. Bohr claims explicitly that we have to renounce
giving a full quantum mechanical description of the classical world
[Bohr 1949, Landau and Lifschit 1977]. Wigner pushes this view to
the extreme consequences and distinguishes material systems
(observed) from consciousness (observer) [Wigner 1961].  Here, on
the contrary, we wish to assume
Hypothesis 1: All systems are equivalent: Nothing a priori
distinguishes observer systems from quantum systems.  If the
observer O can give a description of the system S, then it is also
legitimate for an observer O' to give a quantum description of the
system formed by the observer O.
In appendix A we discuss other possible objections to the "Main
observation"; we also argue that this observation holds also within
the "coherent histories" interpretations of the theory.
We may now proceed to the main point of this work:
If, in quantum mechanics, different observers may give different
accounts of the same sequence of events, then each quantum
mechanical description has to be understood as relative to a
particular observer.  Thus, a quantum mechanical description of a
certain system (state and/or value of measured quantities) should
not be taken as an "absolute" (observer independent) description of
reality, but rather as a formalization, or codification, of the
knowledge, or, more precisely, of the information, that an observer
has about a system.   Quantum mechanics can therefore be viewed as
a theory about the relative information that systems have about
each other. These families of information are all related to each
other:  As illustrated in section 2.2, the fact that a system O has
information about a system S is represented as a correlation
between the state of S and the state of O, when viewed as
information available to a third system O'.
If quantum mechanics describes only relative information, one could
consider the possibility that there is a deeper "underlying" theory
that describes what happens "in reality".  This is the thesis of the
incompleteness of quantum mechanics (First suggested in [Born
1926] !). Examples of such hypothetical "underlying" theories are
hidden variables theories [Bohm 1951, Bel i fante 1973].
Alternatively, the "wave-function-collapse-producing" systems can
be "special" because of some non-yet-understood physics, which
becomes relevant due to large number of degrees of freedom
[Ghirardi Rimini and Weber 1986, Bell 1987], complexity [Hughes
1989], or quantum gravity [Penrose 1989].  As is well known, there
are no indications on physical  grounds that quantum mechanics is
incomplete. Indeed, the practice  of quantum mechanics supports the
view that quantum mechanics represents the best we can say about
the world at the present state of experimentation, and suggests that
the structure of the world grasped by quantum mechanics is deeper,
and not more approximate, than the scheme of description of the
world provided by classical mechanics.   But one could consider
motivations on metaphysical  grounds, in support to the
incompleteness of quantum mechanics. One could argue:  "Since
reality has to be real and universal, and the same for everybody, then
a theory in which the description of reality is observer-dependent is
certainly an incomplete theory". If such a theory were complete, our
concept of reality would be disturbed.
However, the way we have reformulated the problem of the
interpretation of quantum mechanics in sec.1 should make us
suspicious and attentive to such  kinds of arguments. Indeed, what
we are looking for is precisely   some "wrong assumption" that we
suspect to have, and that could be at the origin of the difficulty in
understanding quantum mechanics.  Thus, we discard here the thesis
of the incompleteness of quantum mechanics and assume
Hypothesis 2: (Completeness) Quantum mechanics provides a
complete and self-consistent scheme of description of the
physical world, appropriate to our present level of experimental
observations.
The conjunction of this hypothesis 2 with the "Main observation" of
section 2.1 and the discussion above leads us to the following idea:
Quantum mechanics is a theory about the relative information
that sub-systems have about each other, and this is a complete
description of the world.
The main thesis of this paper is that this conclusion is not self-
contradictory.   If this conclusion is valid, then we have found the
"incorrect notion" at the source of our unease with quantum theory:
The notion of "the 'true' or observer-independent description of the
world".   If a complete description of the world is exhausted by the
relevant information that systems have about each other, then there
is no observer-independent description of the world.   Namely, there
is neither an absolute "state of the system", nor an absolute
"property that the system has at a certain time".  The accounts (1)
and (4) of the sequence of events E  are both correct, even if distinct:
any time we talk about a "state" or "property" of a system, we have
to refer these notions to a specific observing system.
Thus, we suggest that quantum mechanics indicates that the notion
of a "universal" description of the the state of the world, shared by
all observers, is a physically misleading concept.   A description  of
the state of a system S exists only if somebody or something
(namely another system considered as an observer) is actually
"describing" S, or, more precisely, has information about S.  The
state of a system is always a state of that system with respect to a
certain observer  [Crane 1991].  A general physical theory is a theory
about the information that observers have about systems.  We
explore and elaborate this possibility in this paper.
2.4  Information
The relevance of the notion of information for understanding the
deep nature of quantum physics has been advocated by John Wheeler
[Wheeler 1988, 1989, 1992].   The notion of information we employ
here should not be confused with other notions of information
employed in other contexts. We elucidate this notion from two
complementary perspectives.
First, if we collect a certain amount of data about the world, and
organize them within some theoretical structure, we have collected
a certain amount of information.   Let us distinguish the notion of
"theory about the world" on one side from the notion of "theory about
our knowledge of the world", or "theory about the information we
have about the world" on the other side. This distinction is
irrelevant if we assume that a "universal" description of the world
exists and is shared by all observers.  (A theory with a notion of
"time for an observer" as opposite to just "time" is irrelevant if
simultaneity is absolute.)  But if different observers give different
descriptions of the same system, then the distinction becomes
relevant.
This notion of information, however, is too vague for a physical
theory. We need a simpler and more physically precise notion that
characterizes the information that a system has: a notion that does
not require us to distinguish between human and no-human
observers, systems that understand meaning or that don't, very-
complicated or simple systems, or so on.  As it is well known, this
problem was brilliantly solved by Claude Shannon.  The technical
notion of amount of information that we need is the one from
information theory [Shannon 1949]. In the technical sense of
information theory, information is simply contained in the fact that
a system is in a certain configuration, which is (has been)
correlated to some information source;  the amount of information
is the number of the elements of a set of alternatives out of which
the configuration is chosen.  The relation between this notion of
information and more elaborate uses of the notion of information is
simply given by the fact that existence of this information-
theoretical information is a necessary condition for any "elaborate
information" to exist.  Thus, for a physical theory it is sufficient to
deal with this information-theoretical notion of information.
More precisely, the analysis in sec. 2.2 has indicated the following:
The fact that O has information about S simply means (when seen
from O') that the states of O and S are correlated, or that the state
of the S-O system (as described by O') is an eigenstate of the M
operator.  This notion of information is a very weak notion, and does
not require us to consider information storage, thermodynamics,
complex systems, meaning, or anything of the sort.  In particular,
according to this use of the notion of information: i.  information can
be lost dynamically (correlated state may become uncorrelated); ii.
we do not distinguish between "obtained" correlation and
"accidental" correlation (if the pointer of the apparatus indicates
the correct value of the spin, we say that the pointer has
information about the spin, whether or not this is the outcome of a
"well thought" interaction);  ii. any physical system can contain
information about another physical system.  For instance if we have
two spin-1/2 particles that have the same value of the spin in the
same direction, we say that one has information about the other one.
This last point is crucial because if there is any hope of
understanding how a system may behave as an observing system,
without renouncing the postulate that all systems are equivalent,
then the same kind of processes ("collapse") that may happen
between an electron and a CERN machine, may also happen between
an electron and another electron. Observers are not "physically
special systems".
In the next section, we make use of the concepts that emerged from
this discussion, we assume a certain number of postulates
expressed in terms if these concepts, and we derive quantum
mechanics from these postulates.
3.  Reconstruction of Quantum Mechanics
3.1 Basic concepts
The physical theory is concerned with relations between physical
systems.  In particular, it is concerned with the description that
observers give about observed systems. Following our hypothesis 1,
we reject any fundamental or metaphysical distinctions as:  system
/ observer,  quantum system / classical system,  physical system /
consciousness.  We assume the existence of an ensemble of systems,
each of which can be equivalently considered as an observing system
or as an observed system.    A system (observing system ) may have
information about another system (observed system ).  Information
is exchanged via physical interactions. The actual process through
which information is collected and stored is not of particular
interest here, but can be physically described in any specific
instance.
A key idea from information theory that plays a role here is the fact
that information is a discrete quantity: there is a minimum amount
of information exchangeable (a single bit, or the information that
distinguishes between just two alternatives.)   The process of
acquisition of information (a measurement) can be described as a
"question" that a system (observing system) asks another system
(observed system).   Since information is discrete, any process of
acquisition of information can be decomposed into acquisitions of
elementary bits of information.  We refer to an elementary question
that collects a single bit of information as a "yes/no question", and
we denote these questions as Q1, Q2, ... .
We assume that any system S, viewed as an observed system, is
characterized by a family of yes/no questions that can be
meaningfully asked to it. We denote the set of these questions as
W (S) = {Qi, i´ I}, where the index i belongs to a set I (characteristic
of S).  The general kinematical features of S are representable as
relations between the questions Qi in W (S), that is, as structures
over W (S).  For instance, meaningful questions that can be asked to
an electron are whether the particle is in a certain region of space,
whether its spin along a certain direction is positive, and so on.
By asking a sequence of questions (Q1, Q2 , Q3 ... ) to S, an observer
system O may compile a string
(e1, e2, e3, ...... )   (6)
where each ei is either 0 or 1 ("no" or "yes") and represents the
"answer" of the system to the question Qi. (More precisely, the
information that O has about S can be represented as a string.)  It is
of course a basic fact about nature that knowledge of a portion (e1,
... , en ) of this string provides indications about the subsequent
outcomes  (en, en+1, ... ). It is in this sense that a string (6) contains
the information that O has about S.
We distinguish between information contained in an arbitrary string
(6) and r e l e van t  information. Repeating the same question
(experiment) and obtaining always the same outcome does not
increase the information on S. The relevant information (sometimes
simply information  ) that O has about S is defined as the non-trivial
content of the (potentially infinite) string (6), that is the part of (6)
relevant for predicting future answers of possible future questions.
The relevant information is a subset of the string (6), obtained
discarding the e i 's that do not affect the outcomes of future
questions.
Let us make a few observations on the relation between the notions
introduced and traditional notions used in quantum mechanics.
- The notion of question is of course a version of the notion of
measurement.  The idea that any measurement in quantum mechanics
can be reduced to yes/no measurements is well known. A yes/no
measurement is represented by a projection operator onto a linear
subset of the Hilbert space, or, equivalently, by the linear subset of
the Hilbert space itself.  In the present framework this idea is not
derived from the quantum mechanical formalism, but is justified in
information-theoretical terms.
- The notions of observing system and observed system reflect the
traditional notions of observer and system; however, we drastically
prevent ourselves from using any sort of distinction between
classical and quantum systems of the sort advocated by Bohr and by
several other interpretations of quantum mechanics.
- The set of questions that can be asked about a given system S,
namely W (S), reflects the notion of the set of the observables.  We
recall that in algebraic approaches a system is characterized by the
(algebraic) structure of the family of  its observables.
- There is a notion that we have not mentioned here: the state  of the
system.  The absence of this notion is the prime feature of the
interpretation that we are introducing.  In place of the notion of
state, which refers solely to the system, we have introduced the
notion of the information that a system has about another system.
We stress the fact that we do not view the notion of information as
"metaphysical", but as a concrete notion: we imagine a piece of paper
on which outcomes of measurements on S are written, or hands of
measuring apparata, or memory of scientists, or a two valued
variable which is "up" or "down" after an interaction. We discuss
below the precise way in which the existence of this information,
and the physical  process through which information is gained, can
be self-consistently described in physical terms within the
formalism.  As we will see later, this means that a third   observer
can give a complete account (may have complete information) about
the existence of information and the process through which a system
acquires information.
For simplicity, in the following we focus only on the kind of systems
that can be described in conventional quantum mechanics by means
of finite dimensional Hilbert spaces. (We may imagine that all
physical systems can be fully approximated by a discretization.)
This choice drastically simplifies the mathematical treatment of
the theory (avoiding continuum spectrum and other infinitary
issues).  We leave to future work the extension of the present
construction to continuum systems.
3.2 Postulates
Now, we may introduce the first postulate.
Postulate 1 (Limited information).   There is a maximum amount
of relevant information   that can be extracted from a system.
The physical meaning of Postulate 1 is that any system is
essentially finite, and it is possible to exhaust, or "give a complete
description of the system", in a finite time. In other words, any
future prediction that can be inferred about the system out of an
infinite string (6), can also be inferred from a finite subset
s = [e1, ... , eN] (7)
of (6), where N is a number that characterizes the system S. The
finite string (7) represents the knowledge that O has about S.  We
may say that any system S has a maximal "information capacity" N,
where N, being an amount of information, is expressed in bits.  This
means that N bits of information will exhaust everything we can say
about the system S.  Thus, each system is characterized by a number
N.  In terms of traditional notions, N is given by
N = log2 k, (8)
where k is the dimension of the Hilbert space of the system S.  In a
system described by a k dimensional Hilbert space, if I measure a
complete set of commuting observables, I can distinguish one
possible outcome out of k alternatives (the number of orthogonal
basis vectors): in information-theory language, this means that I
gain  information N = log2  k on the system. (We assume here for
simplicity that N is an integer; a generalization to non-integer cases
should not be difficult.)  Postulate 1 is confirmed by our experience
about the world (within the assumption above, that we restrict to
finite dimensional Hilbert space systems. Generalization to infinite
systems should not be difficult). Let us analyze some of its
consequences.
In general, the number of questions that one may include in W (S)  can
be much larger than N.  Some of these questions may not be
independent.  In particular, one may find (experimentally) that
i. A question Q2 may depend on a question Q1; namely, it may be
that a "yes" answer to Q1 always implies a "yes" answer to Q2 .
We denote this relation between Q1 and Q2 as
Q1 =>  Q2.  (9)
The relation => is reflexive (Q=>Q), transitive (if Q1=>Q2 and Q2=>Q3,
then Q1=>Q 3) and, after obvious identifications, antisymmetric (If
Q1=>Q2 and Q2=>Q1, then  Q1=Q2).   Thus  W(S) has the structure of a
partially ordered set.  This is part of the structure of W (S) that we
mentioned above. This structure is what characterizes S.
ii.   A question Q3 may be fully determined by a question Q1 and a
question Q2 , in the sense of being the minimal question for
which  Q1 =>  Q3   and   Q2 =>  Q3.  (By minimal we mean that if
Q1 =>  Q4   and   Q2 =>  Q4 ,  then  Q3 =>  Q4.)   We denote this
possibility as
Q3 = Q1 V  Q2.        (10)
iii. Conversely, a question Q3 may have the property that Q3 =>  Q1
and   Q3 =>  Q2, and being maximal, in the sense that if Q4 =>  Q1
and   Q4 =>  Q2 ,  then  Q4 =>  Q3.   We denote this case as
Q3 = Q1 Λ Q2.        (11)
iv. We may always include in our set of questions a question Qo
whose answer is always "no" and a question Q∞ whose answer is
always "yes". For any Qi, we then have trivially
Qi => Q∞ ,  Qo => Qi .        (12)
v. For any question Q, we can introduce a question not-Q, whose
answer is "yes" if the answer to Q is "no" and vice versa.
vi.  We can introduce a notion of orthogonality as follows.  If Q1 =>
not -Q2  , then we say that Q1 and Q2  are orthogonal, and we
indicate this as  Q1 ⊥ Q2 .
Equipped with the structures described in i.-vi., and under the (non-
trivial) additional assumption that V and  Λ  are defined for every
pair of questions,  W (S) is an orthomodular lattice [Beltrametti and
Cassinelli 1981, Huges 1989].  Other, more subtle ways, in which the
outcome of a question may affect the outcome of another question
are considered below.
If there is a maximal amount of information that can be extracted
from the system, we may assume that  out of W (S) one can select an
ensemble of N questions Qi, which we denote as c = {Qi, i=1, N},  that
are fully independent one from each other.  We do not assume there
is anything canonical in this choice, so that there may be many
distinct families  c , b, q, ... of N independent questions in W (S).  If a
system O asks the N questions in the family c  to a system S, then
the answers obtained can be represented as a string that we denote
as
sc␣  =   [e1, ...... , eN]c       (13)
The string sc  represents the information that O has about S, as a
result of the interaction that allowed it to ask the questions in c .
The string sc␣can take 2N = k values; we denote these values as
sc (1),␣sc (2), ... ,sc(k). So that
  sc(1) = [0, 0, .... , 0]c,
  sc(2) = [0, 0, .... , 1]c,
.....
  sc(k) = [1, 1, .... , 1]c. (14)
Since the 2N possible outcomes sc (1),␣sc (2), ... ,sc (k) of the N yes/no
questions are (by construction) mutually exclusive, we can define 2N
new questions Qc (1)... Qc (k) such that the "yes" answer to Qc ( i )
corresponds to the string of answers sc (i).   For instance:
 Qc(1) = not Q1  Λ not Q2  Λ ....  Λ not QN
 Qc(2) = not Q1  Λ not Q2  Λ ....  Λ  QN
...
 Qc(k) =  Q1  Λ  Q2  Λ ....  Λ  QN. (15)
We refer to questions of this kind as "complete questions". By taking
all possible unions of sets of complete questions Qc (i) ␣  (of the same
family c ), we can construct a Boolean algebra that has Qc (i) as
atoms.
Alternatively, the observer O could use a di f ferent   family of N
independent yes-no questions, in order to gather information about
S.  Let us denote this other set as b .  Then, he will still have a
maximal amount of relevant information about S formed by an N-bits
s t r ing
sb␣  =   [e1, ...... , eN]b (16)
Thus, O can give different kinds of descriptions of S, by asking
different questions.  Correspondingly, we denote as sb(1)... sb(N)  the 2N
values that sb can take, and we consider the corresponding complete
questions Qb(1)... Qb(N)  and the Boolean algebra they generate.   Thus,
it follows from the first postulate that the set of the questions
W (S) that can be asked to a system S has a natural structure of an
orthomodular lattice containing subsets that form Boolean algebras.
This is precisely the algebraic structure formed by the family of the
linear subsets of a Hilbert space, which represent the yes/no
measurements in ordinary quantum mechanics [Jauch 1968,
Finkelstein 1969,  Piron, 1972, Beltrametti and  Cassinelli 1981].
The next problem we should face is the following. What happens if,
after having asked the N question in a family c , the system O asks a
further question Q = QN+1 ?      Let us introduce the second postulate.
Postulate 2 (Unlimited questions).   It is always possible to
acquire new  information about a system.
If, after having asked the N questions in a family c , the system O
asks a further question Q = QN+1 to the observed system S, there are
two extreme possibilities: either the question Q is fully determined
by the N questions in c ,  or not.  In the first case, no new
information is gained.  However, the second postulate assures us
that there is always a way to acquire new information.
The motivation for this postulate is fully experimental.  In fact, we
know that all quantum systems (and all systems are quantum
systems) have the property that even if we know their quantum
state |ψ> exactly, we can still "learn" something new about them by
performing a measurement of a quantity O such that |ψ> is not an
eigenstate of O.  This is an essential experimental  result about the
world, which is coded in quantum mechanics. We expressed it in
information-theoretical terms in postulate 2.  Postulate 2 is true to
the extent the Planck constant is different from zero: in other
words, for a macroscopic system, getting to questions that increase
our knowledge of the system after having reached the maximum of
our information implies measurements with extremely high
sensi t iv i ty .
Since the amount of information that O can have about S is limited
by postulate 1, when new information is acquired, part of the old
relevant information must become irrelevant. In particular, if a new
question Q (not determined by the questions in c ), is asked, then O
should loose (at least) one bit of the previous information. So that,
after asking the question Q, new information is available, but the
total amount of information about the system does not exceed N bits.
The next question that we should face is the extent to which the
information (13) about the set of questions c  determines the
outcome of of the additional question Q.  There are two extreme
possibilities: that Q is fully determined by (13), or that it is fully
independent, namely that the probability of getting a "yes" answer is
1/2. In addition, there is a range of intermediate possibilities:  The
outcome of Q may be determined probabilistically by sc .   We may
define, in general, as  p(Q, Qc (i)) the probability that a "yes" answer
to Q will follow the string sc (i).   Given two complete families of
information sc  and sb, we can then consider the probabilities
 pij =  p(Qb(i), Qc(j)) (17)
From the way it is defined, the 2N  x 2N  matrix pij cannot be fully
arbitrary.  First, we must have
0  ≤  pij  ≤  1. (18)
Then, if the information sc (i), is available about the system, one and
only one of the outcomes sb(j), may result. Therefore
& i   p ij  = 1. (19)
We also assume that p(Qb (i), Qc (j)) = p(Qc (j),Qb (i)), from which we
must have
& j   p ij  = 1. (20)
The conditions (18-19-20) are strong constraints on the matrix 
 
p ij.
Note that they are satisfied if
 
p ij   = | Uij |2 (21)
where U is a unitary matrix, and that
 
p ij  can always be written in
this form for some unitary matrix U (which, however, is not fully
determined by 
 
p ij) .
In order to take into account questions which are in the Boolean
algebra generated by a family sc , as for instance
Qc(jk)  = Qc(j) V Qc(k), (22)
we cannot consider probabilities of the form p(Qc (jk) ,Qb(i)), because
a "yes" answer to Qc (jk) is less than the maximum amount of relevant
information.  But we may for instance consider probabilities of the
fo rm
p i(jk)i =  p(Qb(i) Qc(jk) ,  Qb(i)) (23)
defined as the probability that a "yes" answer to Qb (i) will follow a
"yes" answer to Qb(i)  (N bits of information) and a subsequent "yes"
answer to Qc (jk) (N-1 bits of information).  As is well known, we
have (experimentally) that
p i(jk)i  ≠
p(Qb(i),Qc(j)) p(Qc(j),Qb(i)) + p(Qb(i),Qc(k))  p(Qc(k),Qb(i)) =
=  (pij)2 +  (pik)2 (24)
Accordingly, we can determine the missing phases of U in (21) by
means of
p i(jk)i  =  | UijU ji  +  UikUki |2 (25)
It would be extremely interesting to study all the constraints that
the probabilistic nature of the quantities 
 
p   implies, and to
investigate to which extent the structure of quantum mechanics can
be derived from these constraints. One could conjecture that
eqs.(21-25) could be derived solely by the properties of conditional
probabilities, or find exactly the weakest formulation of the
superposition principle directly in terms of probabilities: this would
be an extremely strong result in the direction we are investigating.
For related attempts to reconstruct the quantum mechanical
formalism from the algebraic structure of the measurement
outcomes, see [Mackey 1963, Maczinski 1967, Finkelstein 1969,
Jauch 1968, Piron 1972].    Here, however, we do not pursue this
direction.  Instead, we content ourselves with the much more modest
step of introducing a third postulate.
Postulate 3 (Superposition principle).  Any question Q can be seen
as part of the (Boolean) algebra generated by a complete family b
of questions; if c  and b define two complete families of
questions, then  
p( Qc(i), Qb(j) ) = |Ucbij|2   , (26)
where Ucb  is a unitary matrix; for every c , b and r , we have Ucr
= Ucb Ubr; the effect of composite questions is given by eq.(25).
It follows that we may consider any question as a vector in a
complex Hilbert space, fix a "basis" of questions |Qc (i)> and represent
any other question |Qb(j)> as a linear combination of these:
|Qb(j)> =  &i    Ubcji |Qc(i)>.  (27)
The matrices
 
Ubc ij could then be interpreted as generating a unitary
change of basis from the  |Qc (i)> to the |Qb(j)> basis.  Recall now the
conventional quantum mechanical probability rule: if |v(i)> are a set
of basis vectors and |w(j)>   a second set of basis vectors related to
the first ones by
|wj> =  & i   U ji |vi>,  (28)
then the probability of measuring the state |wj> if the system is in
the state |v i>   i s
p ij = | <vi | wj> |2 .  (29)
(28) and (29) yield pij = 
 
|U ij|2, which is equation (26).  Therefore the
conventional formalism of quantum mechanics and its probability
rules follow.   The set  W (S)  has the structure of a set of linear
subspaces in the Hilbert space. For any yes/no question  Qi let Li be
the corresponding linear subset of H
.   
The relations
      { =>,  V  ,  Λ  , not,   ⊥  }
between questions Qi  correspond to the relations
{ inclusion, orthogonal sum, intersection,
orthogonal-complement, orthogonality }
between the corresponding linear subspaces Li. The kinematics of
quantum mechanics can therefore be reconstructed from the three
postulates given.  Note, however, that the Hilbert space on which
state vectors live is not attached to a system, but to two   systems,
namely to a system-observer pair
3.3  Dynamics
The inclusion of dynamics in the above scheme is immediate. We
simply notice that two questions can be considered as different
questions if defined by the same operations but asked at different
moments of time.  Thus, any question Q can be labelled by the time
variable t, indicating the time at which it is asked: we denote as t ‘
Q(t) the one-parameter family of questions defined by the same
procedure performed at different times.  As we have seen, the set
W (S) has the structure of a set of linear subspaces in the Hilbert
space. If we postulate that time evolution is a symmetry in the
theory, then the set of all the questions at time t2  must be
isomorphic to the set of all the questions at time t1 . Therefore the
corresponding family of linear subspaces must have the same
structure; therefore there should be a unitary transformation U(t2-
t1) such that
Q(t2) = U(t2-t1) Q(t1) U-1(t2-t1).  (30)
By conventional arguments, we then have that these unitary
matrices form an abelian group and that U(t2-t1) = exp{-i(t2-t1)H} ,
where H is a self-adjoint operator on the Hilbert space, the
Hamiltonian.  Thus, the time evolution too can be viewed as a
structure on the set of the questions that can be asked to a system,
or, more precisely, a structure on the family of all the questions
that can be asked to the system at all times.
3.4  The observer observed
We now have the full formal machinery of quantum mechanics at our
disposal, but with substantial interpretive differences with respect
to the conventional interpretation:  There is no "state of the system"
in this framework.  The issue to be addressed now is the relation
between the information that different observers possess.   The
important point in this regard is that the information possessed by
different observers cannot be directly compared.  This is the
delicate but crucial point of the entire construction.  A statement
about the information possessed by O is a statement about the
physical state of O; the observer O is a regular system on the same
ground as any other system; thus, we may discuss his state in
physical terms.  However, since there is no absolute meaning to the
state of a system,  any statement regarding the state of O is to be
referred to some other system observing O.  The notion of absolute
state  of a system, and thus a fortiori  absolute state of an observer,
is not defined.   Therefore, the fact that an observer has information
about a system is not an "absolute" fact: it is something that can be
observed by a second observer O'.   A second observer O' can have
information about the fact that O has information about S.  But
recall that any acquisition of information implies a physical
interaction. O' can get new information about the information that O
has about S only by physically interacting with the O-S system.
We believe that a common mistake in analyzing measurement issues
in quantum mechanics is to forget that precisely as an observer can
acquire information about a system only by means of physically
interacting with it, in the same way two observers can compare
their information only by physically interacting with each other.
This means that there is no way to compare "the information
possessed by  O " with "the information possessed by O' ", without
considering a physical interaction between the two.  Information, as
any other  property of a system, is a fully relational notion.
How can a system O' have information about the fact that O has
information about S?  The observer O' considers the coupled S-O
system. Thus, she may ask questions to S, or to O, or to the two
together. In particular she may ask questions concerning the
information that O has about S.  Information is simply a property of
some degrees of freedom in O  being correlated with some property
of S. A question about the information possessed by O is in no way
different from any other physical question.  As far as O' is
concerned, knowing the physics of the S-O system means to know
the set  W (S-O) of the meaningful questions that can be asked to the
S-O system, and its full structure. In particular, it also means
knowing how answers at time t1 determine answers at time t2.
A meaningful question to S is whether A is true. Denote this
question as QA.  A meaningful (complete) question about O is whether
his measuring apparatus is ready to (and going to) ask S the question
whether A is true. Denote this question (that O' can ask to O) as
Q Ready . Another meaningful question is whether the hand of his
measuring apparatus has settled to "OA". Denote this question as QOA.
Denote the question whether the hand of his measuring apparatus has
settled to "OB" as QOB.  Each of these questions can be asked at any
time t.
QReady(t): O is going to measure A on S
QA(t): S is A
QB(t): S is B
QOA(t): O has the information that S is in A
QOB(t): O has the information that S is in B (31)
We also consider a complete question QMix(t) to S such that
p(QMix(t), QA(t)) = p(QMix(t), QB(t)) = 1/2. (32)
and define
QReady,Mix(t1) = QReady(t)  Λ QMix(t).  (33)
Knowing the dynamics of the coupled S-O system, O' can work out
the possible outcomes of questions asked at time t2 , given a yes
answer to QR e a d y ,M i x ( t1 ). Assuming standard Hilbert space
Hamiltonian dynamics and assuming that the coupling Hamiltonian
produces a good measurement, O' will compute the probabilities
p( QReady,Mix(t1),  QA(t2) )=1/2 (34a)
p( QReady,Mix(t1),  QB(t2) )=1/2 (34b)
p( QReady,Mix(t1), QOA(t2) )=1/2 (34c)
p( QReady,Mix(t1), QOB(t2) )=1/2 (34d)
Thus, she has no information whether S is in A or B at time t2, nor
information about what the hand of the O apparatus indicates.
However, she may consider asking the question wether O knows
about A or not.  Let us denote this question as Q"O-knows".  This is the
conjunction of two coupled questions:
 Q"O-knows" = [QA Λ QOA]  V [QB Λ  QOB], (35)
and corresponds to the operator M described in sec.2. Note that QA,
QOA , QB  and QOB  are compatible questions, so we can consider
questions in the Boolean algebra they generate.  The dynamics gives
p( QReady,Mix(t1),  Q"O-knows" (t2) ) = 1 (36)
Thus, O'
 
has information that O has information about S [equation
(36)].  This of course is not in contradiction with the fact that she
(O') has no information about S [equation (34a,b)], nor has she
information about which specific information O has about S
[equation (34c,d)].   Thus the notion "a system O has information
about a system S" is a physical notion that can be studied
experimentally (by a third observer), in the same way as any other
physical property of a system. It corresponds to the fact that the
systems S and O are correlated.
Now, the question "Do observers O and O' get the same  answers out
of a system S?" is a meaningless question.  Because it is a question
about the absolute state  of O and O'.  What is meaningful is to
rephrase this question in terms of some observer. For instance, we
could ask this question in terms of the information possessed by a
further observer O", or, alternatively, by O' herself. Consider this
last case.  At time t1 , O gets information about S.  O'  h a s
information about the initial state, and therefore has the
information that the measurement has been performed. The meaning
of this is that she knows that the states of the O-S system,s are
correlated, or more precisely she knows that if at a later time t3
she asks a question to S concerning property A, and a question to O
concerning his knowledge about A (or, equivalently, concerning the
position of a pointer), she will get consistent results.
From the dynamical point of view, notice that knowledge of the
structure of the family of questions  W (S) that can be asked to S
implies the knowledge of the dynamics of S (because  W (S) includes
all Heisenberg observables at all times). In Hilbert space terms, this
means knowing the Hamiltonian of the evolution of the observed
system.   If O' knows the dynamics of the O-S system, she knows the
two Hamiltonians of O and S and   the interaction Hamiltonian. The
interaction Hamiltonian cannot be vanishing because a measurement
(O measuring S) implies an interaction: this is the only way in which
a correlation can be dynamically established.  From the point of view
of O', the measurement is therefore a fully unitary evolution, which
is determined by the interaction Hamiltonian between O and S.  The
interaction is a measurement if it brings the states to a correlated
configuration.   On the other side, O gives a dynamical description of
S alone.  Therefore he can only use the S Hamiltonian.  Since between
times t1  and t2  the evolution of S is affected by its interaction with
O, the description of the unitary evolution of S given by O breaks
down.   The unitary evolution does not break down for mysterious
physical quantum jumps, due to unknown effects, but simply because
O is not giving a full dynamical description of the interaction.  O
cannot have a full description of the interaction of S with himself
(O), because his information is correlation, and there is no meaning
in being correlated with oneself.
The reader may convince himself that even if we take into account
several observers observing each other, there is no way in which
contradictions may develop, provided that one does not violate the
two rules:
i. there is no absolute meaning to the state of a system or the
information that a system has, except within the information of a
further observer.
ii  there is no way a system O' may get information about a system O
without physically interacting with it, and therefore breaking down
(at the time of the interaction) any unitary evolution description
from any observer O'' that is not including both S and O (and their
interaction Hamiltonian!) in its Hilbert space description of the
events.
For instance, there is no way two observers O' and O" can get
information about a system O independently from each other: one of
two (say O') will have to obtain the information first. In doing so,
she will interact with O at a certain time t.  This interaction
implies the fact that there is a non vanishing interaction
Hamiltonian between O and O'. If O" asks a question to O at a later
time t', he will either have to consider the interacting correlated O-
O' system, or to realize the unitary evolution of the O dynamics has
broken down, due to some physical interaction he was not taking into
account.
Finally, one can quantitatively study the relation between
correlation of quantum states and amount of information. We will
not pursue this direction here, but we present two comments in this
regard. We can say in general that the property "O1" of the system O
contains one bit of information about the property "1" of the system
S anytime the S-O system has answered a question Q such that
p( Q,  Q"O-knows-1" ) = 1 (36)
where
 Q"O-knows-1" = [Q1 Λ QO1]  V [not Q1 Λ  not QO1]. (37)
and so on.  There is an alternative (independent) characterization of
amount of information, as the amount of entanglement between S
and O.  Using the Hilbert space formalism, we may consider the state
|Ψ> in the tensor product Hilbert space, and the corresponding pure
state density matrix ρ  =  |Ψ><Ψ |.  If we denote the traces in the two
factor Hilbert spaces by TrS and TrO , then it is easy to see that for a
non entangled state |Ψ> = |ψ>Sˆ|φ>O, we have
TrO (TrS ρ )2 = 1; (38)
while for an entangled state of the form
|Ψ> = 1√n  &i=1,n  |ψi>Sˆ|φi>O, (39)
we have
TrO (TrS ρ )2 = 1/n. (40)
Thus, we may consider the amount of "entangling information"
defined as
N = - ln TrO (TrS ρ )2. (41)
4. Critique of the concept of state
4.1 "Any observation requires an observer"
Let us summarize the path that we have covered.  We started from
the distinction between observer and observed-system.  We have
assumed (hypothesis 1) that all systems are equivalent, so that any
observer can be described by the same physics as any other system.
In particular, we have assumed that an observer that measures a
system can be described by quantum mechanics.  We have therefore
analyzed a fixed physical sequence of events E , from two different
points of observations, the one of the observer and the one of a third
system, external to the measurement.  We have concluded that two
observers give different accounts of the same physical set of
events.
Rather than backtracking in front of this observation, and giving up
our commitment to the belief that all observers are equivalent, we
have decided to take this experimental fact at its face value, and
consider it as a starting point for understanding the world.  If
different observers give different descriptions of the state of the
same system, this means that the notion of state is observer
dependent.  We have taken this deduction seriously, and we have
considered a conceptual scheme in which the notion of absolute
observer-independent state of a system is replaced by the notion of
information about a system that an observer may possess.
We have considered three postulates that this information must
satisfy, which summarize present experimental evidence about the
world.  The first limits the amount of relevant information that a
system can have; the second summarizes the novelty revealed by the
experiments from which quantum mechanics has been constructed by
asserting that whatever the information we have about a system we
can always get new information.  The third limits the structure of
the set of questions; this third postulate can probably be sharpened
considerably. Out of these postulates we have rederived the
conventional Hilbert space formalism of quantum mechanics and the
corresponding rules for calculating probabilities (and therefore any
other equivalent formalism).
A physical system is characterized by the structure on the set W (S)
of questions that can be asked to the system. This set has the
structure of the non-Boolean algebra of a family of linear subspaces
of a complex k-dimensional Hilbert space.  The information about S
that any observer O can possess can be represented as a string s,
containing an amount of information N=log2 k.
Finally, we have studied what is this "information" out of which the
theory is constructed.  We have shown that the fact that a system O
has information about a system S means that the states of S and O
are correlated, meaning that a third observer O' has information
about the coupled S-O system that allows her to predict correlated
outcomes between questions to S and questions to O.  Thus
correlation has no absolute meaning, because states have no
absolute meaning, and must be interpreted as the content of the
information that a third system has about the S-O couple.
Finally, since we take quantum mechanical as a complete description
of the world at the present level of experimental knowledge
(hypothesis 2), we are forced to accept the result that there is no
"objective", or more precisely "observer independent" meaning to the
ascription of a property to a system.  Thus, the properties of the
systems are to be described by an interrelated net of observations
and information collected from these observations.  Any complex
situation can be described "in toto" by a further additional observer,
and the interrelation is fully consistent.  But there is no way to
"exit" from the observer-observed global system. Any observation
requires an observer   [Maturana and Varela 1920].  In other words,
we suggest that it is a matter of natural science whether or not the
descriptions that different observers give of the same ensemble of
events is universal or not:
Quantum mechanics is the theoretical formalization of the
experimental discovery that the descriptions that different
observers give of the same ensemble of events is not universal.
The concept that quantum mechanics forces us to give up is the
concept of a description of a system independent from the observer
providing such a description; that is, the concept of absolute state
of a system.  The structure of the classical scientific description of
the world in terms of systems   that are in certain states  is perhaps
incorrect, and inappropriate to describe the the world  beyond the
¡ ‘ 0  limit.  It is perhaps worthwhile to emphasize the fact that
those considerations do not follow from the theory of quantum
mechanics: they follow from a collection of experiments on the
atomic world.
There are several aspects of the point of view we have discussed
here that require further development. Among these: i. The
reconstruction of sec.3 can certainly be made much more precise,
and postulate 3 can be replaced by a weaker one.  ii. The quantitative
relation between amount of information and correlation between
states, which we hinted at, at the end of sec.3.4, should be studied.
iii.  We believe that it would be extremely interesting to reconsider
EPR-like issues in the light of the considerations made here; notice
that there is no meaning in comparing the outcome of two spatially
separated measurements, unless there is a physical interaction
between the observers.
4.3  Relation with other interpretations
The main distinction between the present approach and Bohr's
original interpretation of quantum mechanics is the fact that Bohr
assumes a classical world.  In Bohr's view, this classical world is
physically distinct from the microsystems described by quantum
mechanics, and it is precisely the classical nature of the apparatus
that gives measurement interactions a special status [Bohr 1949;
for a clear discussion of this point, see Landau Lifshitz 1977].  This
view is pushed to an extreme by Wigner's hypothesis about the role
played by consciousness in the collapse of the wave function [Wigner
1961].
Of course, from the point of view developed here, we can fix once
and for all a privileged system So as "The Observer". In this way we
obtain the standard quantum mechanics interpretation. The quantum
mechanical "state" of a system S is then the information that the
privileged system So has about S. From the present point of view,
Bohr's choice is simply the assumption of a large (consistent) set of
systems (the classical systems) as privileged observers.  This is
fully consistent with our view: the only difficulty is that by doing
so, one becomes blind to the net of interrelations that are at the
foundation of the theory, and puzzled about the fact that the
physical theory treats one system, So  (classical world,
consciousness, .... ), in a way which is physically different from the
other systems.
Notice that the considerations in this paper do not suggest any
modification to the conventional use  of quantum mechanics: there is
nothing incorrect in fixing a preferred observer once and for all.
Thus, acceptance of the point of view suggested here implies
continuing to use quantum mechanics precisely as is it is currently
used.   On the other side, this point of view (we hope) could bring
some clarity about the physical significance of the strange
theoretical procedure adopted in quantum mechanics: we treat a
portion of the world in a different way than the rest of the world.
This different treatment is, we believe, at the origin of a large part
of the common unease with quantum mechanics.
The strident aspect of Bohr's quantum mechanics is cleanly
characterized by Von Neumann's introduction of the "projection
postulate", according to which systems have two different kinds of
evolutions: the unitary and deterministic Schrödinger evolution, and
the instantaneous, probabilistic measurement collapse [von Neumann
1932].  According to the point of view described here, the
Schrödinger unitary evolution of the system S breaks down simply
because the system interacts with something which is not taken
into account by the evolution equations.  Unitary evolution requires
the system to be isolated, which is exactly what ceases to be true
during the measurement, because of the interaction with the
observer. If we include the observer into the system, then the
evolution is still unitary, but we are now dealing with the
description of a different observer.  As suggested by Abhay
Ashtekar, the point of view presented here can perhaps be
characterized by a fundamental assumption prohibiting an observer
to be able to give a full description of "itself" [Ashtekar 1993].
Traditional approaches that try to avoid the dual nature of Von
Neumann evolution can be distinguished between a: the ones that
ascribe reality to the outcome of the measurements and deny reality
to the state (the wave function), and b: the ones that ascribe reality
to the state and deny reality to the outcome of the measurements.
In the first class, we can include the consistent histories
interpretation [Griffiths 1984, Omnes 1988] and the, related,
coherent histories interpretation [Gell-Mann and Hartle 1990]. These
interpretations reduce the description of a system to the prediction
of the system's responses to a set of questions that one can
formulate about the system: they are quite similar in spirit to the
one presented here.  One should distinguish the probabi l i ty   of
histories, which are observer independent, from a statement, made
by an observer, that a certain history of a certain system has
happened.  We believe that such a statement must be meaningful
within the theory if we are to make contact with real observations.
In appendix A, we argue that within the history interpretations
different observers do   make different statements about the same
sequence of events.   One may then want to treat the observer that
makes a specific statement about one   outcome as a quantum
system, and understand the phys ica l  relation between different
descriptions given by different systems.   This is precisely what we
tried to achieve here.  Thus, the histories interpretations are
consistent with the analysis developed here.  What we add here is
increased attention to the process through which the observer-
independent probabilities, attached to families of histories, may be
related to actual  descriptions.
Similar considerations hold for any other interpretation that views
the outcome of the measurement as the only "real" aspect of the
theory  [van Fraassen 1991], or as an actualization of a
potentialities  [Shimony 1969, Fleming 1992].  Indeed, quantum
mechanics is characterized precisely by the fact that the notion of
outcome of a measurement, or the notion of properties being
ascribed to a system only at a certain time t, only make sense at the
price of singling out pre fe r red   moments of times, in which the
potentiality becomes actual. What is it that determines this moment
of time?   As A Shimony put it: "It remains an open problem,
however, ... to determine under what circumstances the actualization
of potentialities generically take place." [Shimony 1969, quoted in
Fleming 1992].  The observation at the basis of this paper is that
this moment of time in which the potentialities become actual, or
the wave function collapse,  is simply determined by the moment in
which a specific physical system not including the observed system
interacts with the observed system. But then the moment in which
potentialities become actual, or in which the empiricist's "data"
come into existence, is completely observer dependent in quantum
mechanics.
Examples of interpretations in the group b are the ones in which the
measurement process is replaced by some hypothetical physical
process that violates the linear Schrödinger equation [Ghirardi
Rimini and Weber 1986, Penrose 1989]. Those interpretation are
radically alternative to the present approach, since they violate
hypothesis 2.  Other examples in the group b are the many world
interpretation [Everett 1957,  Wheeler 1957, DeWitt 1970], and its
variants.  If the "branching" of the wave function in the many world
interpretation is considered as a physical process, it raises, we
believe, the very same sort of difficulties as the von Newmann
"collapse" does. When does it happen? Which systems are measuring
systems that make the world branch? These difficulties of the
many-world interpretation have been discussed in the literature
[See Earman 1986].  If, on the other side, we forget branching, and
we keep evolving the wave function under the unitary evolution, we
obtain the description of the world provided by a fully external
observer, and the problem is to interpret the observation of the
"smaller" observers. This is precisely the problem addressed in this
paper. Thus, also the many worlds interpretation can be taken as a
starting point of the present analysis - although an opposite
starting point than the histories interpretations.
Thus, from the point of view discussed here, Bohr's  interpretation,
consistent and coherent histories interpretations, as well as the
many worlds interpretation, are all quite literarily correct, albeit
incomplete.
Outside physics, the idea of the importance of the observer in any
description of any system [Maturana and Varela 1980, von Foerster
1982]  is today almost a commonplace in disparate areas of thinking
[as an extreme example: Bragagnolo Cesari and Facci 1993]. In
philosophy, both the post-neopositivist tradition and (much more
radically) continental philosophy (as an example: [Gadamer 1989]),
have more and more emphasized the need of referring any
description of an object to the describing observer. It is curious that
quantum mechanics, which contributed so much to inspire these
views, has not yet taken full advantage of them.
The point of view closest to the one presented here is perhaps
Heisenberg's.  Heisenberg's insistence on the fact that the lesson to
be taken from the atomic experiments is that we should stop
thinking of the "state of the system", has been obscured by the
subsequent limpid definition of the theory in terms of states given
by Dirac.  Here, we have taken Heisenberg's lesson to its extreme
consequences.
Our greatest debt, however, is to John Wheeler.  John's insistence
through the years that we have not yet understood "the Quantum",
and his fascinating indications on the connection between
information theory and quantum mechanics ("It from Bit") have
directly inspired the present work.
Acknowledgements
The ideas at the root of this work emerged from: i. A seminar on the
interpretation of quantum mechanics run by Bob Griffiths at
Carnegie Mellon University (1993); ii. A seminar on the same subject
run by John Earman at Pittsburgh University (1992); iii. Louis
Crane's ideas on quantum cosmology; iv. Discussions with Abhay
Ashtekar, Simonetta Frittelli, Al Janis, Ted Newman, Lee Smolin;  v.
A comment made by Bob Geroch; vi. The teachings of Paola Cesari on
the importance of taking the observer into account.   It is a pleasure
to thank them all. In addition, I'd like to thank Al Janis for a carefull
reading of this manuscript. and for many useful criticisms and
comments.
Appendix A
This appendix can be considered as the continuation of section 2.3.
We consider here other possible objections to the observation that
different observers give different descriptions of the same sequence
of events.
Objection 1. The account  (4) is the correct one.  There is no
collapse, nor classical properties of system, but only quantum
states. The description (1) is not correct, because "the wave
function never really collapses".
If so, then the observer O'
 
cannot measure the A property either,
since (because of the fundamental assumption) "it cannot make the
function collapse either"; thus the system S doesn't ever   have the
property A.  But we describe the world in terms of "properties" that
the systems have, namely values that observables take, not in terms
of states in the Hilbert space.  In a description of the world in which
the wave function never collapses, the systems never have definite
properties and we do not see how to match the description with any
observation. [Albert 1992]   If we say "When 'we' observe the system,
then we 'see'  definite properties", then we ascribe to ourselves a
non physical behavior, which is what we are refusing to do.
Alternatively, we accept that 'we' can be described (in principle)
quantum mechanically, and thus we are forced back to the fact that
different observers give different descriptions of the same events.
Objection 2. The account  (1) is the correct one.  Outcomes of the
measurements are the only true content of the theory.   At time t2,
O  does measure  A , then the value of  A  is absolutely determined,
albeit unknown to  O' , (who could measure it later).
This objection is, in a sense, opposite to objection 3. As formulated,
the objection is just wrong: We cannot assume that at time t2  the
value of A is absolutely determined, albeit unknown to  O'
 
because at
time t3 O' may measure an observable that does not commute with A,
and the outcome of which is affected by interference terms between
the two terms in the right hand side of (4).  According to the
objection, these interference terms should not exist, while
according to quantum mechanics they are observable. This objection
confuses quantum mechanical superposition with statistical states:
the r.h.s of (4) is a pure state.
Objection 2 bis. The account  (1) is the correct one.  The interference
terms mentioned above become extremely small if  O  is macroscopic
(because of the decoherence effect).  If they are small enough, they
are unobservable, and thus  A  becomes an absolute property of  S ,
which is true and absolutely determined, albeit unknown to  O' , who
could measure it anytime, and would not see interference effects.
Again, this is definitely wrong, because according to this hypothesis
a property A of S can become an absolute property at time t2, or not,
according to which subsequent properties of S the observer (O')
considers. (We do not prove this here.) This precisely the reason for
which coherent histories interpretations can (consistently) assign
probabilit ies to histories, and not to single outcomes of
measurements within a history.
Objection 3.  What is absolute and observer independent is the
probability of a sequence  A1, ... An of property ascriptions (such that
the interference terms mentioned above are extremely small -
decoherence),  this probability is independent from the existence of
any observer measuring these properties.
This is certainly correct, and, in fact, this observation is at the root
of the coherent histories interpretations of quantum mechanics
[Griffiths 1984, Omnes 1988, Gell-Mann and Hartle 1990].   But this
interpretation confirms our conclusion above that different
observers give different accounts of the same sequence of events,
for the following reason.  The beauty of the histories interpretations
is the fact that the probability  of a sequence of outcomes does not
depend on the observer, precisely as it doesn't in classical
mechanics.  One can be content with this aspect of the theory and
consistently stop here. However, one can also investigate how a
concrete observer (a physicist, a machine) checks that the predicted
probabilities are correct, or uses the theory.  In using the histories
formalism we do not have to make a wave function collapse and we
can forget the observer; but if we do want to compare the theory's
predictions with a set of data, or a physical account of a set of real
physical events that have happened,  then we must recall that this
physical account depends on the choice   of a consistent family of
histories used to describe this sequence of events.  The observer
makes a choice in picking up the family of alternative histories in
terms of which to describe the system. Unlike classical mechanics,
this choice is such that the same property can be true or not,
according to the family chosen [Griffiths 1993].  Now, since the
observer too is a physical system, this choice must be dictated by
the kind of physical interaction that occurs between the observer O
and the system S. Unless we assume that the observer is an
unphysical entity, we then are free to consider how a second
observer would describe the coupled S-O system, and we are back to
the problem above: the descriptions of the same sequence of events
given by the two observers can be different. Classes of observers
may agree on sets of outcomes (or interpret the differences as
statistical ignorance), but there may always be other observers,
perhaps observing the sequence of events and  O, who have chosen a
different alternative family of consistent histories to describe the
same sequence of events. Note that what is different is not the
probabilities, but the actual description of what happened in a
concrete instance. Thus, the consistent histories interpretation
confirms the conclusion that if an observer O gives a description of
a sequence of events, another observer may give a different
description of the same sequence.
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